This paper presents the Offshore-Intensity Ratio -a simple and straightforward way to identify which countries and jurisdictions could be seen as offshore financial centres (OFCs). By setting the aggregated amount of external capital booked in a jurisdiction in relation to the size of its domestic economy, we get a ratio that expresses the strength with which the particular jurisdiction has acted as a magnet for foreign capital. Sixteen jurisdictions are identified as probable OFCs, including the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda and Luxembourg, but also Ireland and the Netherlands. A novel visualization shows the role of the largest offshore centres in contemporary global finance.
Introduction
During the last fifty years, offshore finance has evolved from a peripheral phenomenon to a central constituent of contemporary capitalism. Offshore finance allows private investors and corporations to escape taxation and regulation of the 'onshore' jurisdictions in which they live and operate. Hence, offshore financial centres are virtually always both tax and regulatory havens. In essence, these jurisdictions enable predominantly rich individuals (so called 'high net worth individuals' or HNWIs) and large multinational corporations (MNCs) to be 'elsewhere, ideally nowhere' by creating legal spaces that escape existing regulations and controls enacted by onshore countries (Palan and Nesvetailova 2014) . Calculations by Zucman (2013) have shown that private assets amounting to about USD 6 trillion are registered in offshore financial centres (OFCs), three-quarters of which are unrecorded in official statistics.
According to estimates by Henry (2012) , assets (financial and non-financial) in the amount of USD 21-32 trillion could be located in tax havens. OFCs have also played an important role in the global financial crisis, because they are central elements of the 'shadow banking system' (FSB 2014) . Some OFCs have acted as legal domiciles for the creation of complex structured financial products, such as collateralized debt obligations and other asset-backed securities. 2 These opaque financial products have contributed to the development of the financial crisis, or at least to the aggravation of the crisis (Lysandrou and Nesvetailova 2015) .
The measures taken by the G20 in 2009 to increase the regulation of offshore finance have merely led to a relocation of assets between tax havens, but not to a general decline of assets booked in OFCs (Johannesen and Zucman 2014) . Rixen (2013) characterizes the reforms implemented so far as largely symbolic and relatively ineffective measures that primarily serve the political function to demonstrate state activity in this highly sensitive policy field to national electorates. The fact that a far-reaching international regulation of OFCs has not happened yet and that these tax havens potentially contribute to financial crises of great magnitude suggests a high academic and societal relevance of research on offshore financial centres. OFCs are not purely geographic or economic phenomena, however. At the core, the topic of OFCs is about political sovereignty (Palan 1998 (Palan , 2002 Palan et al. 2010 ). In fact, many
OFCs are dependent territories that use their (inner) sovereignty to attract financial activities from abroad through low taxation and lax regulation. Hence, in most instances OFCs (and the HNWIs and MNCs that primarily use them) benefit at the expense of onshore countries and the majority of the population that do not utilize 'offshore' (Denault 2011; Shaxson 2011 ).
The international debate about offshore finance and its consequences has clearly been intensifying in recent years. Increasingly it becomes more widely understood that offshore finance is not a phenomenon that only pertains to small islands in exotic parts of the world.
On the contrary, geographically speaking many large OFCs are not located 'off-shore' but onshore in North America (e.g. the US state of Delaware) or continental Europe. In November 2014, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) released a report that quickly gained widespread media attention and became known as the 'Luxembourg Leaks' (Wayne and Carr 2014) . The ICIJ report revealed that the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg helped nearly 350 large MNCs to lower their global tax bills drastically, Amazon and IKEA for example.
These MNCs have channelled hundreds of billions of dollars through this tiny jurisdiction and as a result saved billions of dollars in taxes elsewhere. Another example, which has drawn a lot of attention in recent years is a tax construction known as the 'Double Irish With a Dutch Sandwich' that reduces taxes for large MNCs (most prominently Apple) by shifting profits from an Irish subsidiary to the Netherlands then back to Ireland and subsequently elsewhere, e.g.
to Caribbean tax havens (Duhigg and Kocieniewski 2012) .
Measuring Offshore Financial Centres
Offshore finance has attracted increasing scholarly attention. However, which countries and jurisdictions can be reliably identified as OFCs? There is still no universally accepted definition of the term OFC. Most observers agree that a central characteristic of tax and regulatory havens is that they seek to attract foreign capital through special legislation, which allows 3 foreigners to evade and escape taxation and regulation of their 'home' countries. However, many analysts and organizations that have published lists of OFCs disagree which jurisdictions precisely should be included (see Palan et al. 2010) . A working definition that is well suited for empirical research is from Zoromé (2007:7) : 'an OFC is a country or jurisdiction that provides financial services to nonresidents on a scale that is incommensurate with the size and the financing of its domestic economy.' On the one hand, such an approach might seem a bit simplistic, because it does not look into the jurisdictions to see if they specifically tried to attract foreign capital by lowering their standards in order to attract external capital.
However, the simplicity of this approach is also its great advantage, because it leads to one single ratio that is easy to compare with other jurisdictions. Zoromé based his analysis only on data for portfolio investment, thus excluding the two segments of direct investment and foreign bank deposits. I build on Zoromé's approach, however I include these two important segments of cross-border global finance. Together, foreign banking deposits, foreign direct investment, and foreign portfolio investment constitute virtually the entire international (i.e. cross-border) financial system -excluded are only reserve assets held by central banks and derivatives, for which no comparative data are available and which are difficult to classify.
Using all three segments enables a better overview about the true scale of offshore finance.
Foreign portfolio investment is admittedly the largest of the three segments (USD 46.6 trillion in 2013), but foreign direct investment (USD 27.9 trillion in 2013) and foreign bank deposits (USD 21.6 trillion in 2013) are hardly insignificant (IMF 2015a (IMF , 2015b BIS 2015a) . Thus, in 2013 these three segments of cross-border global finance together amounted to USD 96.1 trillionmore than 25 per cent larger than global GDP (USD 75.6 trillion).
I proceed as follows; for each jurisdiction, I aggregate the three segments of cross-border finance to produce one value that combines all foreign capital that is booked in the particular jurisdiction. In the next step, I divide this value by the GDP of the jurisdiction. The result is a ratio that specifies the intensity with which any given jurisdiction acts as an OFC; this OffshoreIntensity Ratio describes the strength of a jurisdiction to function as a magnet for foreign capital. By setting the foreign capital that has been attracted to the particular jurisdiction in relation to its domestic economy we get a ratio that is readily understandable and that can easily be compared between different jurisdictions. Thus, the Offshore-Intensity Ratio is complementary to the Financial Secrecy Index developed by the Tax Justice Network (TJN 2013a). The Financial Secrecy Index -combining a secrecy score with a global scale weight for each jurisdiction -is a very valuable and thoroughly researched coefficient. However, the Financial Secrecy Index most likely understates the role of some OFCs significantly, becausesimilar to the approach by Zoromé -it only uses data pertaining to portfolio investment. The distinction between portfolio investment and direct investment is an arbitrary one though.
The IMF defines direct investment as investment by a resident of one country in a corporation that is resident in another country to have control or exert significant influence 4 over the management of that corporation (IMF 2015b). Direct investment comprises both 'greenfield' investment -the building of new facilities -as well as stakes in private or publicly listed corporations, for example through cross-border mergers & acquisitions. Direct investment is theorized to be longer term than portfolio investment. However, according to the IMF, it is direct investment when an investor owns more than 10% of the voting rights of a foreign corporation, below that threshold it is portfolio investment (IMF 2015b). The threshold of 10% is completely arbitrary, however. Imagine the situation that an investor holds 11% of the voting rights of a foreign corporation but remains passive and does not attempt to influence the management of the company. In this situation, the holdings would be classified as direct investment. If, on the other hand, an activist investor such as a hedge fund owns a stake of 9% in a foreign target firm and successfully influences the company to pay a special dividend, initiate a share buy-back program or sell itself to another corporation, the holdings would be treated as portfolio investment (see Fichtner 2013a Fichtner , 2013b Fichtner , 2015 for analyses of hedge funds). Hence, there is no objective rationale for the arbitrary division between direct and portfolio investment at the 10% threshold. Consequently, it makes sense to include direct investment in an analysis of offshore finance. The cases of the Netherlands and Luxembourg, the two eminent global direct investment conduits according to the IMF, will support this argument later on in this paper. Similarly, the segment of foreign banking deposits should not be excluded from our analysis, because jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands, Ireland, and others host very large amounts of foreign banking assets. This paper builds on a previous publication, in which I have compiled a ratio for offshore-intensity using 2011 data only for foreign portfolio investment and foreign banking assets (Fichtner 2014 ).
The structure of this paper is as such: I begin with the smallest segment, foreign bank deposits, and present the most intensive jurisdictions and the amount of external capital they have attracted. The next section covers foreign direct investment, followed by a section on the largest of the three segments, foreign portfolio investment. Subsequently, I aggregate all three segments and present the 'Offshore-Intensity Ratio' for the top forty global jurisdictions.
In the final section of the paper, I present a novel visualization showing the position of the largest OFCs within the entire contemporary system of cross-border global finance.
Foreign Bank Deposits
To analyse cross-border banking activities, the locational banking statistics by the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) are well suited. I use data on external deposits of reporting banks vis-à-vis individual countries, covering all sectors (BIS 2015a). Table 1 provides an overview of the forty most intensive countries and jurisdictions in the segment of external banking assets. Data is presented for total foreign bank deposits (FBD), the GDP of the jurisdiction, and finally for 'Banking-Intensity', the ratio of FBD divided by GDP. -all these British dependencies have very high banking-intensity values. Hendry and Dickinson (2011, p.12) characterize the position of these jurisdictions in international law as follows:
'The overseas territories are plainly not independent sovereign states. Their external relations 7 remain the responsibility of the UK, the sovereign power. Accordingly, the UK is responsible for each of the territories under international law.' In legal terms, these territories could in fact still be referred to as 'colonies' of the UK (ibid.). In a bizarre twist, however, the territories are not constitutionally parts of the UK (or the EU), but under direct authority of the Crown.
The Queen also appoints the governor of each territory. Even though the British Overseas Switzerland, the traditional epitome of a banking centre catering to foreign clients is -perhaps surprisingly to some -slightly less banking-intensive than the UK. Of course, it could be that Switzerland significantly underreports external bank deposits. However, this caveat applies to almost all jurisdictions that appear in Table 1 , and the value of Swiss foreign bank deposits is roughly in line with findings by Zucman (2013) . The next segment is foreign direct investment, which is almost thirty per cent larger than global foreign bank deposits. Table 2 are in fact understating the direct investment holdings of both countries significantly). They act as the eminent global corporate havens; MNCs have routed trillions of dollars through these conduit jurisdictions to save taxes elsewhere. Of course, there are also 'legitimate' holdings in these numbers included, e.g. when a Belgian firm builds Dutch facilities. However, the very high values of direct investment-intensity suggest that these holdings constitute only a tiny share of the giant amounts of direct investment booked in these two conduits.
The category of ambiguous jurisdictions (place 17 to 21) this time only comprises five jurisdictions, again including Switzerland and the UK. The high absolute amounts of direct investment of both countries could be the result of the strong activity of MNCs in cross-border mergers & acquisitions, which are part of direct investment. There are also many other interesting aspects in Table 2 , which can only be touched upon briefly in this paper. For example, the Netherlands too have a dependent territory that acts as an OFC: Curaçao, a remnant of the former Netherlands Antilles that were dissolved in 2010. Similar to the British dependencies, Curaçao is part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands but has internal autonomy to set tax rates. These British and Dutch colonial vestiges act as very intensive offshore jurisdictions. Before we turn to the largest segment of cross-border global finance, portfolio investment, it is important to note that I have used indirect data, e.g. the amount of direct investment holdings for a jurisdiction that all participating counterpart economies have reported to the IMF (CDIS Table 6 'Direct Investment Positions Cross-classified by Counterpart Economies'). Most OFCs do not participate in the CDIS; thus, if we used the inward direct investment positions reported only by participating jurisdictions, we would miss them. 
Foreign Portfolio Investment
The approach to use indirect data is also useful for the largest of the three segments of crossborder global finance, foreign portfolio investment (which consists mostly of shares and bonds Table 3 Six jurisdictions (places 10 to 16) are ambiguous; they have portfolio-intensity values of over two times the global average (1.24 in 2013) but less than the more decisive threshold of five times. Hence, jurisdictions such as the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and Switzerland could potentially be considered as OFCs, but the situation is not that clear. Note that in the segment of portfolio investment the median of 0.5 is lower than the simple global average of 0.62 -even if we disregard jurisdictions that have less than USD 10 billion in foreign assets due to their relative unimportance in the international context.
The Offshore-Intensity Ratio
Now we are in a positon to aggregate the three segments of foreign bank deposits, foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment, in order to achieve a truly broad and comprehensive overview about the role of different jurisdictions in offshore finance. For each jurisdiction, I combine the three segments of cross-border finance to produce one value that aggregates all external capital that is booked in the particular jurisdiction. Then, this value is divided by the GDP of the jurisdiction. The result is a ratio that specifies the intensity with which any given jurisdiction has acted as an OFC. Thus, the Offshore-Intensity Ratio describes the strength of a jurisdiction to function as a magnet for foreign capital. By setting the foreign capital that has been attracted to the particular jurisdiction in relation to its domestic economy we get a ratio that is readily understandable and that can easily be compared between different jurisdictions. As mentioned above, in 2013 the three segments of crossborder global finance together amounted to USD 96.1 trillion. This is more than 25 per cent larger than global GDP (USD 75.6 trillion). Hence, the simple global average is roughly 1.27; the median is slightly lower at 1.0. It is extremely difficult to say which value of offshoreintensity is 'normal' for a jurisdiction. Values that are between the median of 1.0 and the global average of 1.27 could very likely be considered as commensurate for the size and the financing of the domestic economy. As shown in Table 4 , countries such as Italy, the United States, Canada, Spain, and Norway fall in this category. Above two times the simple global average of aggregated foreign assets (2.54) it is doubtful that the foreign assets can still be considered as commensurate. Hence, countries such as Belgium, the United Kingdom, Singapore and Switzerland could already be seen as OFCs, but clearly more research and a much more intense debate about this is needed. Jurisdictions that have Offshore-Intensity Ratios above five times the simple global average (6.35) have a very high probability to be OFCs. Perhaps surprisingly to some, the Netherlands (with a value of exactly 6.35) could thus be considered an offshore financial centre. This is mainly due to the enormous amounts of foreign direct investment that have been routed through this country; the Offshore-Intensity
Ratio for the Netherlands would have been even much higher if the officially reported direct investment assets had been used instead of the indirectly measured direct investment.
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Conclusion
The Offshore-Intensity Ratio is a very simple and straightforward way to identify which countries and jurisdictions could be seen as offshore financial centres. By setting the aggregated amount of external assets that has been attracted in relation to the size of the domestic economy we get a ratio that expresses the strength with which the particular jurisdiction has acted as a magnet for foreign capital. It is not the purpose of this paper to establish exact thresholds for identifying offshore financial centres, for there are no 'objective' thresholds. Instead, there has to be an intense academic and public discussion about this pivotal topic. The data presented in Tables 1 -4 as well as in the novel visualization of global finance show that a relatively small number of offshore financial centres are responsible for the majority of offshore financial activities. These jurisdictions include the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the Cayman Islands, Bermuda and others. Many mainstream economists still argue against a stricter regulation of offshore finance on the grounds that due to its high mobility, capital would supposedly just shift to another jurisdiction to evade regulatory measures. The findings of this paper, however, suggest that a stricter regulation of a few key offshore jurisdictions could have a very significant effect, because certain segments of global finance (e.g. direct investment in the Netherlands and Luxembourg) or specific financial actors (such as hedge funds in the case of the Cayman Islands or money market funds in Ireland) are strongly concentrated there.
